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INTRODUCTION

One of the widely touted advantages of the multiple public sector
labor law regimes is that the jurisdictions serve as laboratories for experimentation and evaluation of various approaches to the complex issues
involved in the field. In order for the laboratory approach to work most
effectively, it is necessary to analyze the law and its impact in various
jurisdictions. This Article conducts such an analysis with respect to two
of the jurisdictions at opposite ends of the legal spectrum, Illinois and
Virginia.' The range of state laws in the public sector includes states

with constitutional bargaining rights2 and comprehensive statutes 3 at one
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author wishes to thank the members
of the Labor Law Group who commented on an earlier version of this research presented in
June 2006 and Professor Joseph E. Slater for his comments on a later draft. She also thanks
Jonathan Hruska, Theresa Childress, Jemika Davenport, Christopher Rathlev, and Joseph Laws
for valuable research assistance and the University of Richmond for research support.
1 The focus of this Article is the law relating to state and local government employees
rather than federal sector employees. Some of the data, however, include all public sector
employees. Where that is the case, it will be noted.
2 Three states, Florida, Hawaii, and Missouri, have constitutional provisions establishing the right of public sector employees to bargain collectively. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6;
HAW. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-9.
3 Constitutional bargaining rights and comprehensive statutes do not necessarily parallel
one another. Missouri, which recently recognized as constitutional the right to collectively
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4
end and states where collective bargaining is illegal on the other. Illinois has a long history of public sector bargaining and has enacted two
comprehensive bargaining statutes which took effect in 1984. 5 The statutes are patterned after the private sector National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), but they are more favorable for public sector employees in a
number of respects. 6 By contrast, Virginia outlawed public sector collective bargaining by court decision in 1977 and later confirmed the decision by statute in 1993. 7 A comparison of the two approaches and the
resulting realities in the two states provides lessons for both the remainder of the public sector and the private sector. 8
Section I analyzes the legal framework and history of collective bargaining in Illinois, and Section II follows with a similar analysis for Virginia. Each section includes current data about public sector employees
and union activity in the two states. Section III follows with a discussion
of possible explanations for the differences in the law of the two states.

bargain, see Independence-Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 139
(Mo. 2007), has yet to amend its bargaining statute to conform to the decision. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 105.510 (2000) (barring some classes of public employees, such as teachers, from
collective bargaining). Recently, numerous bills have been intoduced in the Missouri General
Assembly that would allow all public employees to bargain collectively. See, e.g., H.B. 1159,
95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S.B. 473, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2009); S.B. 1115, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008). A number of states have
comprehensive bargaining statutes in the absence of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Public
Employment Relations Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.201-423.512 (2000); N.Y. Civ. SERv.
LAW §§ 200-214 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-4117.24 (2004).
4 Virginia and North Carolina outlaw bargaining in the public sector and six other states
do not formally allow bargaining by any public employees. See RICHARD C. KEARNEY WITH
DAVID G. CARNEVALE, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 62-63 (3d ed. 2001). Indi-

ana and Missouri governors revoked executive orders that gave executive branch employees
bargaining rights in 2004. See MARTIN M. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS, Professor's Update 2 (2007). As noted above, however, in 2007 the
Missouri Supreme Court held that the state constitution protected bargaining rights. See Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d at 139. Even in the absence of bargaining rights, however,
there is a federal constitutional right to join unions under the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288 (7th Cir. 1968); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F.
Supp. 1068, 1075 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
5 See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 14-39 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 60, 90, and accompanying text. Recently introduced legislation in
Congress would require states to authorize bargaining for public safety officers. See Public
Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act, H.R. 980, 11 0th Cong. (2007); Public Safety
Employer-Employee Cooperation Act, S. 2123, 110th Cong. (2007). If this bill is passed and
upheld by the courts, Virginia would have to amend its laws to conform. The House passed
H.R. 980 by a vote of 314-97 on July 17, 2007, but no vote has been taken in the Senate.
House Vote On Passage: H.R. 980: Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of
2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2007-633 (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
8 As Joseph Slater has correctly pointed out, the public sector has often been ignored in
the study of United States labor relations. See JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE 1900-1962 1-2 (2004).
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Section IV looks at the lessons from this analysis for state and federal
lawmakers, unions, employers, and labor relations advocacy groups.
An examination of Illinois and Virginia law and labor relations, and
comparisons to the private sector, reveal that state labor law strongly
affects public sector labor relations. Whether law is the cause or the
effect, or more likely both, where the law is more favorable to unions
and collective bargaining, unions are more prevalent and more active,
and where unions are more prevalent and more active, the law is more
favorable to unionization and bargaining. This conclusion provides support for those advocates and lawmakers who contend that changing the
law will positively affect unionization rates and bargaining.
Equally important, however, this Article shows that parties operating in different legal regimes adapt their strategies to fit their environment. The success of those strategies is not unique to the particular
environment, however, and thus they may be useful in other contexts. In
today's constantly changing workplace, investigation of different strategies in anticipation of future changes will help preserve employee representation. The representational strategies used in Virginia's hostile legal
environment share similarities with strategies that some unions and other
employee advocacy groups are beginning to use in the private sector.
The constant organizing done out of necessity in Virginia could also benefit unions in more traditional legal environments. Finally, more flexible
and cooperative relationships may flourish in less traditional settings.
The labor relations field is, and will continue to be, in a state of flux.
Those that explore alternatives (lawmakers and participants in the systems alike) are more likely to have surviving and even thriving labor
relations systems and relationships, and accordingly, more successful
governmental and business operations.
I.

A.

ILLINOIS

The Law and History

There is a long history of collective bargaining in the Illinois public
sector, although the comprehensive Illinois bargaining statutes were late
in coming to fruition. 9 Although the Illinois legislature passed a collective bargaining law in 1945,10 the governor vetoed it, allowing Wisconsin to become the first state to enact a comprehensive collective
bargaining law for public employees in 1959.11 In 1967, labor opposed a
9 Employees in Illinois do not have a state constitutional right to bargain.
10 See R. Theodore Clark, Jr. & F. Donal O'Brien, IllinoisPublic Sector Collective BargainingLegislation: The FirstFifteen Years, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES 195, 195 (Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stem, eds.,
2001).
"1 Id.
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collective bargaining bill introduced in the Illinois legislature because of
its broad prohibitions on the right to strike; the bill failed to pass.' 2 Finally in 1983, after repeated efforts, the Illinois legislature enacted two
comprehensive collective bargaining statutes, one covering educational
employees (the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act or "IELRA")
and the other covering state and local government employees outside the
educational sector (the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act or
13
"IPLRA").
Both statutes, like most in the public sector, were patterned after the
private sector NLRA. 14 Unlike many public sector statutes, however, the
IELRA and the IPLRA allow strikes by all employees except police officers, firefighters, paramedics, and security personnel.1 5 Other significant features of the legislation are the grandfathering of existing
bargaining units, including those that are inconsistent with the law, and a
requirement that the parties to existing collective bargaining agreements
continue to bargain about subjects included therein even if they are not
mandatory subjects under the Illinois statutes.16 For example, the IPLRA
allows police and fire bargaining units to include supervisors if the units
existed before the enactment of the statute.' 7 These provisions exceed
the protections under the NLRA.
The broader protections for employees contained under the Illinois
statutes, as compared to the NLRA, are captured in many other ways. 18
The definition of a supervisor, an individual who is excluded from the
protection of the statutes, is narrower under the Illinois statutes than
12 Id.

13 See id. at 196-99 (describing the political process of enactment of the two statutes and
noting that Chicago mayors' opposition likely precluded earlier passage of a comprehensive
collective bargaining law). See also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/1-315/27 (2006); 115 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/1-5/21 (2006).
14 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 198.
15 See id. Only ten states have legislation allowing some public employees to strike
while thirty-five outlaw some or all strikes. See KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 4, at
235.
16 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 199.
17 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3(s)(1) (2006).
18 Notably, suggestions for reform and revitalization of the NLRA have included
changes that would make the NLRA more like the Illinois statutes. See, e.g., CHARLES B.
CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?

THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT

126-155 (1993); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 151-179 (1993); PAUL C.
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW,
243-252 (1990) [hereinafter WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE]; THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION], available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.

cgi?article=1004&context=key workplace; Marion Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REV. 953,
1011-21 (1990); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1804 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises to
Keep].
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under the NLRA, thereby including more employees under the protection
of the laws. 19 Interns and residents at public hospitals are included as
employees under the IPLRA. 20 The IPLRA also covers certain personal
care attendants and day care home providers, classifying them as employees of the state for purposes of bargaining. 21 Both Illinois statutes
limit the use of public funds to influence union representation elections, 22 while the use of employer funds for anti-union campaigns has
19 Compare 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3(r) (2006) (defining "supervisor," for all personnel
except police officers, under the IPLRA, as an individual who spends a preponderance of his
or her employment time conducting supervisory activities), and 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2 (g)
(2006) (defining "supervisor," under the IELRA, as an individual who spends a preponderance
of his or her time conducting supervisory activities), with 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000) (defining "supervisor," under the NLRA, as an individual who conducts supervisory activities, regardless of the amount of time spent on those activities, as long as they are not occasional
temporary supervisory assignments). See also NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532
U.S. 706, 713 (2001) (stating that an employee is a statutory supervisor if (a) he or she holds
the authority to engage in any one of the twelve listed supervisory functions, (b) the exercise
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment, and (c) the authority is held in the interest of the employer); Ohio Power Co. v.
NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1949) (finding that the test of the performance of supervisory duties under the NLRA is not the frequency of the exercise of such duties, but the existence of authority for such purpose); Edward Street Daycare Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 189 F.3d
40,46 (1st Cir. 1999) (same); NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir.
1949) (noting that the listed supervisory function should be read in the disjunctive so that if an
employee has authority to do any of the twelve functions, the employee is a supervisor).
20 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.315/3(n) (2006). In 1999, the NLRB held that interns, residents, and fellows are employees under the statute, reversing a decision twenty years earlier
that ruled such persons were primarily students and therefore not statutory employees. See
Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 159, 168 (1999). In 2004, the Board overturned its
previous decision in New York University, 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000), which was based in part
on Boston Medical Center, and declared that graduate assistants were not employees, but
rather primarily students. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004).
21 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3(n), (o) (2006); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9A-1 1(b-5)
(2006). Home care workers were given collective bargaining rights by gubernatorial executive
order prior to the amendment that included them under the statute. See Peggie Smith, The
Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in State Labor Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1390,
1410-11 (2008). Illinois was the first state to cover publicly subsidized family day care providers under its collective bargaining law. Id. at 1415. Inclusion of such workers is significant
for the labor movement. In 2005, more than 49,000 family child care workers in Illinois voted
for union representation, the second largest membership election for the labor movement since
1941. Id. at 1390-91. In 1999, home care workers in Los Angeles were responsible for the
largest increase in new union membership in one union election since 1941. Id. at 1390.
Home care workers are often excluded from the coverage of the NLRA as either independent
contractors or domestic employees. Id. at 1400-03. The NLRB has used the right to control
test to determine if such workers qualify as employees. See Peggie Smith, Union Representation of Family Child Care Providers, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 347 (2007). See also
Rosemount Ctr. Workers Ass'n, 248 N.L.R.B 1322, 1324 (1980) (including family home
mothers in the unit because of the center's right to control); Cardinal McCloskey's Children &
Family Servs., 298 N.L.R.B. 434, 436 (1990) (excluding family child care providers because
control was only pursuant to state regulations and guidelines, suggesting that the providers
might be state employees).
22 See 5 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 315/10(a)(6) (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14(a)(9) (2006).
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23
been credited with reducing the unionization rate in the private sector.
24
Further, the Illinois statutes have time limits for conducting elections.
These time limits are in place to prevent the delays that have characterized representation proceedings in the private sector, which have made it
more difficult to unionize private sector employees seeking representation. 25 Finally, the Illinois statutory Boards 26 can designate a union as the
exclusive representative of employees based on evidence of majority status (e.g., dues deduction authorizations); the Boards do not need to hold

27
a representation election.

The Illinois laws require inclusion of grievance and arbitration procedures in collective bargaining agreements, a common, but not required,
feature in the private sector. 2 8 Generally, the Boards and courts that interpret the Illinois statutes have read the duty to bargain quite broadly,
requiring negotiation on some subjects that many other states have excluded from negotiations. 29 During the hiatus between collective bar30
gaining agreements, dues and fair share fees still must be deducted.
23 See Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 18, at 1769.
24 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/9 (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7(c)(2) (2006).
25 See Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 18, at 1787-95.
26 The IELRA is enforced by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB),
while the IPLRA has two enforcement panels of the Illinois Labor Relations Board, one for
Chicago and Cook County (the Local Panel), and one for the remainder of the state (the State
Panel). See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 203; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/5.1 (2006); 115
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5 (2006).
27 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/9 (a-5) (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7(c-5) (2006).
The Employee Free Choice Act, which would include a similar provision in the NLRA, has
passed in the House but has not had enough votes to overcome a Republican-led filibuster in
the Senate. See Supporters of Card Check Bill Fall Short of Votes Needed to Limit Senate
Debate, 21 LAB. REL. WEEK (BNA) 925 (June 28, 2007). Based on the results of the 2008
elections, supporters have been hopeful for passage again in 2009. See Union Groups Rally
for Card Check Bill At Capitol as ChamberReiterates Opposition, 23 LAB. REL. WEEK (BNA)
258 (Feb. 12, 2009). Post-election, there were at least fifty-eight votes for the bill in the
Senate according to some counts. Congress Gears Up With Large Job-Creation Package,Pay
Equity, Card Check Bills, 23 LAB. REL. WEEK (BNA) 5 (Jan. 29, 2009). Early in Congress'
first session of 2009, with the Senate race in Minnesota still undecided and the only Republican Senator to previously support the bill having reversed his position, however, passage of the
Employee Free Choice Act was far from assured. See Kate Phillips, Specter Says He Won't
Back Union Bill Again, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 25, 2009, at A17. Both labor and management
groups continue to campaign hard for and against the legislation, respectively. See id.
28 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/8 (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10(c) (2006). Such a
provision might be viewed as less protective of employee rights than the NLRA since, under
the NLRA, a union can negotiate the right to strike over grievances. However, in today's labor
relations climate, it probably benefits both employees and the union. The right to strike under
the Illinois statutes requires contract expiration. See 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13(b-4) (2006); 5
ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/17(2) (2006).
29 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 206-07.
30 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/9 (a-5) (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7(c-5) (2006). In
HaciendaHotel, 331 N.L.R.B. 665 (2000), the NLRB held that the contractual obligation to
deduct dues expired with the contract, regardless of whether dues deduction was tied to a
union security provision. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the Board did
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The union violates the duty of fair representation it owes to all employees it represents only if its conduct is intentional. 31 Attorneys' fees are
available as sanctions for frivolous litigation. 32 Under the IPLRA, contracts can bar decertification of the union or a petition by another union
for a longer period than under the NLRA, increasing the stability of
union-management relationships. 33 The primacy of collective bargaining
is further emphasized by statutory provisions that make the bargaining
laws controlling in the event of conflict with other laws. 34
Not only do the Illinois statutes favor employee bargaining rights 3 5
but a review of the administrative and judicial decisions reveals that state
administrative agencies and courts have broadly interpreted the statutes
to further the goals of encouraging bargaining and protecting employee
rights. 36 This is in contrast to many decisions made by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and courts narrowly interpreting the
NLRA. 37 Where the Illinois courts have restricted bargaining rights, the
not adequately explain its conclusion that a dues deduction clause without a union security
provision should be treated differently than other contract provisions that cannot be changed
unilaterally during a contract hiatus. See Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas v. N.L.R.B, 309
F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 2002). On remand the Board maintained that the Respondents "did not
violate Section 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act by unilaterally ceasing dues checkoff after the
parties' collective-bargaining agreements expired ....
Hacienda Hotel, 351 N.L.R.B. No.
32, at * 1 (2007). The Board, however, did not rely on the legal precedent cited in its earlier
decision but instead based its finding on the factual circumstances of the case, in which the
dues checkoff provisions in the parties' agreement contained explicit language limiting the
dues checkoff obligation to the duration of the agreements. See id. at *3.
31 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/10 (b)(1) (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14(b)(1) (2006).
This may not be viewed as protective of employees, but rather of unions. Limitations on union
liability, however, may encourage unionization and therefore, collective bargaining. In the
private sector, the interpretation of the duty of fair representation does not limit violations to
situations where the union's conduct is intentional. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1906
(4th ed., Patrick Hardin et al. eds. 2001).
32 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/11(c) (2006); 115 ILL. COMa. STAT. 5/15 (2006). The
NLRA does not contain a provision for awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing parties, but the
agency does adjudicate those cases in which it finds reasonable cause to believe a violation has
occurred so a charging party does not need legal representation. See 29 U.S.C. §160 (2000).
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the respondent can get fees from the agency if the
respondent wins the case and the agency's position was not substantially justified. See 5
U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2000).
33 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/9(h) (2006) (5 years). Under the NLRA, the contract bar
is limited to three years. See Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
34 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/15(a), (b) (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17 (2006).
35 The Illinois statutes are not exclusively favorable to the collective bargaining rights of
employees. For example, in 1995 the legislature imposed limitations on bargaining applicable
only to the Chicago public schools. See P.A. 89-15, §10 (amending 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
4.5 and 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-8.1a). In 2003, the legislature again altered the statute,
making previously prohibited subjects of bargaining for the Chicago public schools permissive. See P.A. 93-3, §10 (amending 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4.5). For further discussion of
these amendments, see Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 202.
36 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 206-07.
37 See generally Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the
Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569 (2007)
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legislature has often responded with statutory amendments. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the state Board could not assert
jurisdiction over certified court reporters because the Court was a coemployer of the reporters. 38 The legislature amended the statute to pro39
vide bargaining rights to the court reporters.
Two further legal provisions in Illinois are worthy of note, as they
bear on labor relations and differ substantially from the law of Virginia.
Illinois is a home rule state. The Illinois Constitution provides in Art.

VII, § 6 (a):
A County which has a chief executive officer elected by
the electors of the county and any municipality which
has a population of more than 25,000 are home rule
units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to
become home rule units. Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and
affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals
40
and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.
The IPLRA states that it supersedes home rule powers except where
specifically authorized by the statute. 4 ' Finally, Illinois has no right-towork law.
B.

The Reality

Although collective bargaining in the public sector was extensive in
Illinois prior to the enactment of its labor statutes, passage of the legisla(discussing NLRB decisions weakening statutory ights); ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE
WORKERS' LAW 7-10, 80-98 (2006) (discussing judicial distortion of NLRA); Cynthia L.
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1559-64 (2002)
(discussing United States Supreme Court cases that have forced the NLRB to more restrictively interpret the NLRA and arguing that NLRB decisions are accorded little deference under
judicial review); James J. Brudney, Symposium: The Changing Workplace: Reflections on
Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 Tax. L. REV. 1563, 1572-75 (1996) (discussing dramatic decline in support for concerted activity and collective bargaining in NLRA cases
decided by the Supreme Court since 1970).
38 See AOIC v. Teamsters Local 726, 657 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. 1995).
39 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/2.5, 3(o-5)(1), (2), (3) (2006).
40 See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (a).
41 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/15(c) (2006). This limitation on home rule is protective of
collective bargaining as it would prevent a locality from opting out of the statute. The IELRA
has no similar provision expressly relating to home rule but does provide that if the statute
conflicts with "any other law, executive order or administrative regulation," the IELRA controls. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/17 (2006).
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tion increased unionization substantially. 42 As of 2008, 50.3% of public
employees in the state were union members and 52.8% were covered by
collective bargaining agreements. 4 3 Average hourly earnings are $23.32
for unionized public sector workers in Illinois and $21.61 for nonunion
public sector workers.4a The Illinois Education Association, an affiliate
of the National Education Association (NEA), is the largest public sector
union in Illinois, while the Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT), affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), also has a significant presence, especially in Chicago. 45 Both represent teachers and
educational support personnel. 46 The American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) also represents a substan47
tial number of public employees in Illinois state and local government.
Unionization among police and firefighters is widespread. 48 In terms of
overall unionization, Illinois ranks third in the nation in the total number
of union members in the state and tenth in the nation in percentage of
49
workers who are union members.
The public sector unionization rates in Illinois are very high as compared to the national private sector rates, which have continued to decline
as the NLRB has narrowly interpreted the NLRA in ways less favorable
to unionization and bargaining. Current private sector union membership
stands at 7.6%,50 as compared to 50.3% among Illinois public sector employees. 5 1 There is also a dramatic difference between public sector
unionization rates in Illinois and Virginia, as Virginia law is even more
hostile to bargaining than the NLRA.
42 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 199; Martin H. Malin, Public Sector Collective
Bargaining: The Illinois Experience, (NIU Center for Government Studies, Policy Profiles),
Jan. 2002, at 4.
43 See BARRY T. HIRSCH & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS
DATA BOOK
44 Id.

31 (2009).

45 Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 199-200. The IFr currently has approximately
90,000 members, and its Chicago presence includes the Chicago Teachers Union Quality Education Standards and Teaching (QUEST) Center. IFT Home Page, http://www.ift-aft.org/
Forms/index3.aspx?TID=top6&PID=16 (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter IFT Home
Page]. The IEA currently has approximately 130,000 members. IEA Home Page, http://
www.ieanea.org/about.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter lEA Home Page].
46 Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 200. See also EA Home Page, supra note 45; IFT
Home Page, supra note 45.
47 Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 200. See also AFSCME 2007, Council 31, Form
LM-2, http://erds.dol-esa.gov/query/ (follow "Union or Trust Search" hyperlink; then enter
"542-218" in box titled "File Number"; click "Submit"; click "2007 Report") (indicating
62,129 members in Illinois). A number of smaller AFSCME locals in Illinois have several
thousand additional members. Id.
48 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 200.
49 HIRSCH & MACPHERSON, supra note 43, at 28.

50

Id. at 31.

51

See id. at 31 and accompanying text.
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While both the IPLRA and the 1ELRA allow strikes, relatively few
strikes have occurred under the IPLRA, while more have occurred
among teachers covered by the IELRA. 52 Scholars' explanations for the
greater number of teachers' strikes focus on the limited costs incurred by
striking teachers, since the teachers will likely make up the days lost in
order to maintain state funding and therefore will be able to keep most, if
not all, of their wages. 53 Moreover, it is difficult to enjoin teacher strikes
under the law. 54 The explanation for the lower number of strikes under
the IPLRA may be that many of the pre-statute strikes occurred to establish union recognition, which is now determined through statutory procedures. 55 Furthermore, since collective bargaining was a familiar process
from the pre-statute days, the parties were already experienced at suc56
cessfully resolving disputes at the time the Illinois statutes were passed.
The enactment of the Illinois statutes coincided with a general drop in the
number of strikes and a relatively stable and predictable economy. This
57
may have made it easier to resolve disputes.
II.

VIRGINIA

A review of the law, history, and reality in Virginia shows dramatic
differences from Illinois and the private sector.
A.

The Law and History

As far back as 1946, the Virginia General Assembly expressed its
opposition to collective bargaining for public employees in the form of a
joint resolution. 58 Nevertheless, like Illinois, Virginia has a history of
collective bargaining in the public sector, at least at the local level. 59
However, legal collective bargaining came to an abrupt halt in 1977 with
the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in Virginia v. Arlington
52 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 209; Malin, supra note 42, at 4-5.
53 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 209. Professor Malin's research on strikes
before and after the statutory legalization of strikes demonstrated that, perhaps contrary to
expectations, legalization did not increase the number of strikes and probably contributed to a
decrease instead. See Malin, supra note 42, at 4-5.
54 See Martin H. Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 313, 341-42 (1993).
55 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 209.
56 See id.
57 See id. The final reason offered by these authors is that the right to strike and corresponding preparations by employers reduced posturing and fostered agreement. Id.
58 See Senate Joint Resolution No. 12, Unionization of Officers and Employees of the
Commonwealth, February 8, 1946.
59 See Commonwealth of Virginia, Rights of Public Employees, Report of the Study
Commission, House Document No. 28, at 6 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Commission Report]
(describing collective bargaining agreements covering teachers in at least ten school districts,
other school employees, county workers, sanitation employees, and firefighters).
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County.60 At the time of the case, Arlington County had multiple collec-

tive bargaining agreements with unions representing the county's
firefighters, teachers, nonprofessional school employees, school administrators, and all other county employees. 6 1 The state filed an action
against the county arguing that Arlington County had exceeded its powers by entering into the agreements. 62 The court noted that Virginia follows the Dillon Rule, which holds that subdivisions of the state have
only those powers that the state expressly gives to them, or those which
follow from express powers by necessary implication. 63 Where the
power is granted, but without express direction as to how it should be
carried out, the governmental unit may choose a reasonable method of
execution. 64 In this case, there was clearly no express grant of power
from the state to engage in collective bargaining. 65 The court then
moved to the question of whether the express power given to state governmental units to enter into contracts, hire employees, and determine the
terms and conditions of employment also contained an implied power to
bargain collectively or if their express powers permitted the local governments to select collective bargaining as a reasonable method of executing
their powers. 66 The court answered in the negative, stating that it was
contrary to legislative intent and not "necessary to promote the public
interest. '67 The court relied on Virginia's failure to enact legislation authorizing collective bargaining, except in the limited arena of transportation employees; several opinions from the Attorney General suggesting
that local governments lacked the power to enter into binding collective
bargaining agreements; and the fact that the enumerated powers to hire,
68
contract, and set working conditions preceded public sector bargaining.
Prior to this decision, nearly one-third of Virginia's teachers were
covered by collective bargaining agreements, along with thousands of
police officers, firefighters, and other government employees. 69 Shortly
after the Arlington County decision, the Virginia Supreme Court struck
another blow to the state's teachers, ruling that binding arbitration for
60
61
62
63

Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 232 S.E.2d 30, 45 (Va. 1977).
See id. at 33.
See id. at 31.
See id. at 39-40.

64 See id. at 40-4 1.
65 See id. at 41.
66 See id. at 40-41.
67 Id. at 43.
68 See id. at 43-44.
69 Jeffrey F. Webb, A Decade After Commonwealth v. County Board of Arlington: Public Employee Bargaining in Virginia Reconsidered, 18 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB.
SECTOR 59, 61 (1989). See also Robert R. Richards & Patrick W. Carlton, Relative Deprivation and Teacher Militancy in Virginia: A Model and its Application, 12 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 355, 359 (1983) (noting that more than 30,000 public employees were
covered by collective bargaining agreements in 1977).
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disputes between school boards and their employees was an unconstitutional delegation of power. 70 Preceding Arlington County, several Virginia study commissions had considered whether to recommend
71
legislation relating to bargaining for public employees.
In 1973, the appointed Commission recommended that the General
Assembly of Virginia adopt grievance procedures for public employees
and enact legislation regarding the enforceability of agreements relating
to terms and conditions of employment. 72 The report also recommended
that any legislation be uniform, 73 and that "the General Assembly should
encourage a policy of providing methods whereby public employees,
both state and local including those of constitutional offices, may effec74
tively express their views concerning matters which affect them."
However, this latter recommendation was not a majority recommendation for collective bargaining legislation. Six Commission members added an addendum stating their belief that collective bargaining was not
appropriate for public employees. 75 Nevertheless, a draft "meet and confer" bill, which had been discussed by the Commission, accompanied the
76
report.
In response to the report, the General Assembly enacted legislation
requiring grievance procedures for employees of the state and localities
with fifteen or more employees. 7 7 In addition, a recommendation for
inclusion of public employees in the right-to-work law was enacted into
legislation. 78 The "meet and confer" bills and the bills making collective
bargaining agreements enforceable were all defeated. 79 The 1973 Commission recommended that it continue to operate, and in 1974 the Commission issued another report.8 0 The 1974 report recommended
70 See Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 468, 473 (Va. 1978). The
case involved an arbitration provision of a grievance procedure adopted by the State Board of
Education, not a collectively bargained procedure. Id. at 469.
71 See Webb, supra note 69, at 60-61. The Commission was created by the General
Assembly and composed of twelve members, five appointed by the Speaker of the House, two
appointed by the Committee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate, and five appointed by
the Governor from the state at large. Commonwealth of Virginia, Report of the Commission to
Study the Rights of Public Employees, House Document No. 12, at 1 (1973) [hereinafter 1973
Commission Report]. The members appointed by the General Assembly could be members of
that body, but were not required to be. Id.
72 See 1973 Commission Report, supra note 71, at 3.
73 See id. at 6. This recommendation was likely in response to pressure to authorize
bargaining for some groups of public employees, as many states have done through piecemeal
legislation.
74 Id. at 4.
75 See id. at 8-9.
76 See id. at 23-35.
77 See 1974 Commission Report, supra note 59, at 1.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 1-2.
80 See id. at 2.
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legislation to legalize contracts between labor unions and employers that
did not
chose to enter into such agreements. 8 ' A "meet and confer" bill
82
members.
Commission
of
majority
a
of
support
command the
Additionally, the Commission studied the progress of the implementation of grievance procedures pursuant to the legislative enactment.
The Commission also studied opportunities for employees to provide input on employment policies pursuant to a legislative resolution passed by
the General Assembly the previous session, indicating that public policy
requires creation of such opportunities. 83 The Commission concluded
that there was significant progress in establishing grievance procedures
at the state level, limited progress at the local level, and little progress in
creating opportunities for employee input. 84 The Commission was reappointed for the following year (1975), but with several changes in
5
membership.
The year 1974 was the high point for advocates of legislation establishing collective bargaining in Virginia. A majority of the 1975 Commission did not support even limited legislation to permit localities and
unions to enter into enforceable collective bargaining agreements. 86 Although the legislative subcommittee recommended such legislation, the
Commission as a whole split 6-6 on the proposal. 87 The 1975 Commission also analyzed the progress in implementation of the grievance procedures, finding that at the state level, fifty grievances had been filed,
while at the local level, only 98 of the 127 local governments that were
required to implement grievance procedures had done S0.88 The 1975
Commission did not address the issue of employee input.
Subsequent to the Arlington County decision, there were additional
efforts to legalize public employee collective bargaining, but none were
81 See id. at 6.
82 Id. at 5.
83 See id. at 1, 6-11.
84 See id. at 8-11.
85 See Webb, supra note 69, at 60.
86 Commonwealth of Virginia, Rights of PublicEmployees, Interim Report of the Commission to Study the Rights of Public Employees to The Governor and The General Assembly
of Virginia, House Document No. 28, at 4-5 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Commission Report].
87 See id. at 4 (stating that the Commission was not successful in reaching a majority

opinion).
88 See id. at 26. Notably, the Commission suggested that the fact that only 0.07% of
state employees had filed grievances indicated that the Commonwealth was providing excellent working conditions for its employees. Of course, there are other possible explanations for
the limited number of employee grievances. Indeed, a General Assembly Committee Report
from 1978 identified a number of criticisms of the procedure and made special accommodations to obtain information from employees who feared reprisal for testifying in regards to
those criticisms. Commonwealth of Virginia, Report of the Joint Senate and House General
Laws Committees Study on Grievance Proceduresto the GeneralAssembly of Virginia, Senate
Document No. 23, at 6-7 (1978).
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successful.8 9 In fact, the results were quite the opposite. In 1993, the
General Assembly felt the need to codify the Arlington County decision
by enacting a statutory bargaining prohibition. 90 However, the statute
allows employees to form associations to promote their interests to their
employer.9' In addition, several opinions and reports of the Attorney
General have recognized that employers can discuss working conditions
with their employees. 92 Further, another relevant legislative mandate is
the section of the Virginia code on the standards of quality for education,
which requires each school board to establish a "system of two-way
communication between employees and the local school board and its
administrative staff whereby matters of concern can be discussed in an
orderly and constructive manner."'93 The General Assembly also has
modified the legislation relating to grievance procedures over the years,
but still requires the use of the procedure for state employees as well as
employees of local governments which have more than fifteen
94
employees.
B.

The Reality

The change in the legal climate had a dramatic effect on public sector union membership in Virginia. Between 1972 and 1978, union mem95
bership dropped from 38.5% to 19.5% of public sector workers.
Despite the judicial and legislative decisions to ban binding collective
bargaining, however, unions still play an active role in Virginia's public
sector, albeit a much smaller role than Illinois unions play. The current
percentage of public employees who are union members in Virginia is
89 See Webb, supra note 69, at 61; Patrick W. Carlton & Richard T. Johnson, TeacherBoard Relations in Virginia:A Case of PerceptualDiscontinuity, 10 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 267, 271-73 (1981).
90 See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (2008).
91 See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.3 (2008). This provision merely codifies what is already a federal constitutional right, however. See Henrico Prof'l Firefighters Ass'n v. Bd. of

Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237, 246-47 (4th Cir. 1981).
92 See Bd.of Supervisors, 649 F.2d at 240; 1979-1980 Op. Atty Gen. Va. 298, 298-99,
1980 Va. AG LEXIS 240.
93 VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-253.13:7.C.1 (2008).
94 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-1506-1507 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3000,
3003-3006 (2008). Local government compliance with the grievance procedure requirements
has been mixed. See, e.g., Report of the Department of Employee Relations Counselors on the
Statutory Compliance of Local Government Grievance Procedure to the Governor and the
GeneralAssembly of Virginia, Senate Document No. 9 (1986).
95 See Lon S. Felker et al., Public Sector Unionization in the South: An Agenda for
Research, 13 J. CoLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 1, 4, 9 (1984). While the decision

outlawing bargaining was issued in 1977 by the Virginia Supreme Court, the legal efforts
began earlier. See Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 232 S.E.2d 30, 43-44
(Va. 1977).
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9.3%, while 11.7% are covered by collective bargaining agreements. 96
The average earnings of unionized public sector workers in the state are
$28.81 per hour, while nonunion public sector workers average $27.29
per hour. 97 In terms of overall union membership, Virginia ranks
twenty-sixth in the number of union members and forty-eightth, very
near the bottom, in the percentage of workers who are union members. 98
The unions that are most active in Virginia's public sector are predominantly the same unions that are most active in Illinois, including affiliates
of the NEA, the AFT, the International Association of Firefighters
(IAFF), and AFSCME. 99
What options are available for unions that cannot negotiate binding
collective bargaining agreements? As noted previously, employees have
a constitutional right to join labor unions and these unions represent employees in a number of forums. Unions in the public sector promote
legislation that favors public employees and oppose legislation that they
identify as detrimental to public employees.' °° These unions speak
96 HIRSCH & MACPHERSON, supra note 43, at 35. Presumably those employees covered
by collective bargaining agreements are federal employees or perhaps employees covered by
nonbinding memoranda of agreement. See infra notes 117, 210, and accompanying text.
97 HIRSCH & MACPHERSON, supra note 43, at 35.

98 Id. at 29.
99 See 1973 Commission Report, supra note 71, at 6 (reporting, inter alia, contracts with
AFSCME and IAFF); 1975 Commission Report, supra note 86, at 10 (reporting testimony by
various locals of the Virginia Education Association (VEA) and the IAFF); Virginia Professional Fire Fighters (VPFF), Who are the Virginia Professional Fire Fighters, http://www.
vpff.org/Membership/WhoAreVPFF.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (indicating affiliation
with the IAFF and organization of 51 local unions representing over 6000 firefighters and
paramedics); Interview with David Pulliam, President, Richmond Fire Fighters (June 7, 2006)
(indicating Richmond Fire Fighters have 84% membership); Interview with Marian Flickinger,
President, Norfolk Federation of Teachers (NFr) (June 5, 2006) (indicating 99% membership
among teachers in the Norfolk Public Schools); Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, Staff Attorney, VEA (June 6, 2006) (indicating that the VEA has over 60,000 members in Virginia);
Interview with Donald Baylor, President, AFSCME Council 27 (June 6, 2006) (indicating that
the union has almost 1000 members working in corrections, mental health, juvenile justice,
social services, alcoholic beverage control, and medical facilities).
100 See, e.g., VEA, 2009 VEA Legislative Agenda, http://www.veanea.org/legislative/legagenda-2009.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008); VPFF, Recent Accomplishments of the VPFF/
IAFF Partnership,http://www.vpff.org/Membership/VPFFAccomplishments.htm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2008) (listing legislative accomplishments and initiatives); IAFF Local 2068, Fairfax
County, Legislative Information, http://www.fairfaxfirefighters.org/Legislative Info.htm (last
visited Aug. 18, 2008) (listing 2007 legislative priorities); Virginia Troopers Alliance (VTA),
Why Join the VTA, http://www.virginiatroopersalliance.com/vta-apr._15,-2007_.003.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2008); Fraternal Order of Police of Virginia, Legislation, http://www.va
statefop.comlegislation.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (listing 2008 legislative priorities);
Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99; Interview with Donald Baylor, supra note 99
(describing lobbying as a lifeline of the organization and identifying successful initiatives to
include corrections officers under the law enforcement retirement act, reducing age and service
requirements for full retirement). See also VA. CODE Ar. § 51.1-212 (2008) (amending the
Virginia Law Officers' Retirement System's definition of employee to include corrections
officers).
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°
before legislative commissions, 0 1 county boards,10 2 city councils,1 3
0
4
school boards,'
and other governmental bodies to advocate for employee rights. Unions also represent employees in the existing grievance
procedures established by law. 10 5 Such representation may obviate the
need for legal representation, which can be costly for employees. The
existence of the grievance procedure, while it may have been intended to
forestall unionization and substitute in part for collective bargaining, provides a vehicle for unions to prove their value to current and potential
members. Unions also represent employees in other legal proceedings
related to their employment. 10 6 In some jurisdictions, employees have
even engaged in concerted activities such as "working to the rule" or
taking down from the classroom all items paid for by the teachers. 0 7 In
short, public sector unions in Virginia, like public sector unions in Illinois and nationwide, serve as a voice for the workers they represent. In
addition to representation in various legislative, judicial, and administrative forums, unions provide other value-added benefits to their members
such as insurance, educational workshops, and support for families of
members who have been killed or injured.' 0 8 Unions also engage in

101 See 1975 Commission Report, supra note 86, at 10; Report of the Joint Subcommittee
Studying The Continuing Contract Status Law for Instructionaland Administrative Personnel
to the Governor and General Assembly of Virginia, S. Doc. No. 31, at 9-10 (1988) (reporting
testimony of VEA representatives before the Joint Subcommittee).
102 See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors, 649 F.2d at 239-240 (describing efforts by president of
association to speak to county board on behalf of the association and its members regarding
county's handling of heart-lung disability claims).
103 See Interview with David Pulliam, President, supra note 99 (describing importance of
relationships with city council and successful efforts to convince former lobbyist for the organization to run for city council).
104 See Memorandum from VEA Legal Staff, Collective Bargaining in Virginia: What's
Prohibited - What's Not (Jul. 19, 2004).
105 See, e.g., VEA, Legal Services: Your Safety Net, http://www.veanea.org/legal-services/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (listing various situations where VEA assisted
employees in grievance proceedings); VTA, Why Join the VTA, supra note 100; Interview with
Michael Mohler, President, Virginia Association of Professional Firefighters (June 20, 2006);
Interview with Guy Horsley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Virginia Attorney General's
Office (June 20, 2006); Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99.
106 See, e.g., VEA Legal Services: Your Safety Net, supra note 105 (listing various situations where VEA assisted employees in other legal proceedings, including defense against
criminal charges and efforts to obtain benefits); VPFF, Recent Accomplishments of the VPFF/
IAFF Partnership,supra note 100 (listing legal action on behalf of members); VTA, Why Join
the VTA, supra note 100 (listing various legal proceedings for which the VTA provides legal
assistance to members); Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99; Interview with Donald Baylor, supra note 99 (indicating that the union provides some limited legal assistance to
membership but such assistance is limited by the small number of members and when membership was higher, additional services were provided).
107 See Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, supra note 99; Stafford Teachers Take a Stand,
http://www.veanea.org/vea-on-your-side/stafford.html (last visited April 27, 2009) (describing
work to the rule action by teachers in Stafford County, Virginia).
108 See VPFF, Recent Accomplishments of the VPFF/IAFFPartnership, supra note 100
(listing support for the family of a firefighter killed on the job); VPFF, What the VPFFDoes,
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charitable endeavors to benefit their communities.109 These activities
can generate support for the union. When the union needs political support, it may contact those who have benefited from union largesse to
make calls and write letters to political leaders in support of union
objectives. " 0
The limits on Virginia unions, however, preclude them from negotiating binding collective bargaining agreements. Once a union in Illinois
is certified as an employee representative, the focus shifts to negotiating
successive contracts governing terms and conditions of employment, and
administering those agreements by representing employees in the grievance and arbitration procedure.ll Illinois statutes allow the union to negotiate fair share provisions requiring nonmembers to pay the costs of
collective bargaining, contract administration, and other activities affecting wages, hours, and conditions of employment through payroll deduction.'1 2 In Virginia, by contrast, the unions must convince employees to
join the union and pay dues despite the inability to negotiate a binding
agreement. Unions must convince members to continue to pay dues,
whereas in states like Illinois the typical contract provides for dues to be
deducted from the employee's paycheck and remitted to the union.' 13
Union leaders in Virginia describe a continual need to organize the
workforce." 4 The organizing campaign does not end with certification,
as it often does in states with collective bargaining and fair share
rights. 115
http://www.vpff.org/Membership/WhatTheyDo.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (same); VTA,
Why Join the VTA, supra note 100 (listing benefits of membership); Norfolk Federation of
Teachers, Reasons to Join, http://nft4261.org/reasonstojoin.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2008)
(describing benefits of membership); Fraternal Order of Police of Virginia, Membership Information and Benefits, http://www.vastatefop.com/membership.htm (last visited March 19,
2008) (listing benefits of membership); Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99
(describing professional development workshops and parent workshops offered by the union);
Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, supra note 99 (detailing professional training benefits provided by the union); Interview with David Pulliam, supra note 99 (describing insurance
benefits).
109 See VPFF, Recent Accomplishments of the VPFF/IAFF Partnership,supra note 100
(listing charitable work of the local unions); Interview with David Pulliam, supra note 99
(describing union's charitable activities, including building playgrounds, enhancing parks,
working with school programs, and raising money for fuel assistance).
110 See Interview with David Pulliam, supra note 99.
111 See Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, CharterSchools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
885, 918 (2007).
112 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e) (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11 (2006).
1 13 See id.
114 See Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99; Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, supra note 99.
115 Wise unions, however, recognize that it is necessary to continue a form of organizing
to maintain the connection of employees to the union. Moreover, in right-to-work states,
where no union security clause can be negotiated, the same need to organize continually exists.
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Furthermore, because any agreements that are reached are nonbinding, unions in Virginia must also work continually to sustain relationships with employers and legislative bodies that control the terms and
conditions of employment.' 16 Even in the absence of collective bargaining rights, however, several unions in Virginia have negotiated nonbinding memoranda of agreement with employers. 117 According to the
unions, employers generally comply with such agreements. 118 Employers and unions in some areas of Virginia have reported healthy, productive relationships where they work together on a regular basis. 1 9 For
example, the Norfolk Federation of Teachers (NFT) and the Norfolk
School System worked together and succeeded in winning the Broad
Prize for the top urban school system in the nation in 2005.120
Given the absence of collective bargaining rights, how have unions
been able to achieve such agreements? One possible explanation is that
some of the union-management relationships preceded the elimination of
collective bargaining in Virginia. 12 1 In addition, some of the union officers have been leaders of their organizations for many years, allowing
for continuity and stability within both the union and the union-employer
116 See Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99.
117 See id.; Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, supra note 99.
118 See Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99 (indicating that the union is included in the making of all major decisions, and that the union and the employer have an
effective working relationship); Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, supra note 99 (indicating
that the Richmond Education Association, which has a very high percentage of teachers as
members, and the Richmond School Board have a relationship that functions like a traditional
bilateral union-management relationship).
119 See Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99; Interview with David Pulliam,
supra note 99; Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, supra note 99.
120 See Press Release, Norfolk Public Schools, Norfolk Public Schools Wins Top Urban
Education Award (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.nps.kl 2.va.us/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id= 149:norfolk-public-schools-wins-top-urban-education-award&catid=l 1l:september-2005&Itemid= 133 (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). In the two previous years,
the school system was one of five finalists for the award. Id.; Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99.
121 See Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, supra note 99 (indicating that school districts in
Norfolk, Richmond, Virginia Beach, Fairfax, Alexandria, and Arlington bargained with unions
prior to 1977); 1973 Commission Report, supra note 71, at 6 (describing collective agreements
with firefighters and county workers in Fairfax County; teachers in Fairfax, Arlington, Alexandria, Prince William, and Newport News, with negotiations in progress in Powhatan, Page,
Waynesboro, Virginia Beach, and Prince George Counties; sanitation workers in Alleghany
County; and county workers and school employees in Arlington County); 1974 Commission
Report, supra note 59, at 6 (indicating that collective agreements covering teachers had increased 100% over the previous year and that agreements also existed covering firefighters,
school employees, county government workers, and sanitation workers); 1975 Commission
Report, supra note 86, at 15 (indicating that about nineteen jurisdictions in the state had entered into collective bargaining agreements covering at least some employees to which the
localities adhered despite several opinions from the Attorney General stating that the localities
had no authority to enter into such agreements).
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relationship.1 22 Those unions that operate most effectively in Virginia
are concentrated in firefighting and education-areas with strong national organizations and a strong history of organizational activity.12 3
Further, public sector unions have an advantage that private sector unions lack, as public sector unions can play a role in electing their employers through the exertion of political influence in campaigns for the same
public offices that are responsible for negotiating with unions. Thus,
they can mobilize political power to help them accomplish their goals by
supporting candidates that are more sympathetic to unions' positions. 124
Notably, the average wages for both union and nonunion public sector
workers in Virginia exceeded those in Illinois, and in both states unionized workers had a wage advantage over their nonunion counterparts.1 25
All is not rosy for unions in Virginia, however. The unions that are
thriving represent workers primarily in local government in large metropolitan areas.126 As noted, the unions in firefighting and education have
been particularly successful. 127 This success may be attributable to the
122 See NFT History, http://nft4261.org/history.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (indicating that the charter president has been continually reelected, leading to continuity and effective
leadership); Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99 (same); Interview with David
Pulliam, supra note 99 (indicating that he has been union president for twenty two years).
123 See KEARNEY wrrM CARNEVALE, supra note 4, at 66. While there are other effective
unions, they are often smaller in number.
124 See Interview with Michael Mohler, supra note 105 (noting that the political arena is
the bargaining table for his union and that the union has been able to obtain wages and benefits
comparable to firefighters in similar jurisdictions where bargaining is lawful); Interview with
David Pulliam, supra note 99 (describing extensive grassroots lobbying and creation of relationships with various civic groups to develop political base); Norfolk Federation of Teachers,
Reasons to Join, http://nft4261.org/reasonstojoin.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008); see also
KEARNEY wrrH CARNEVALE, supra note 4, at 124-26 (describing electoral activities of
unions).
125 See supra notes 44, 97, and accompanying text. Since average wage data does not
control for the type of job, the effect of unionization on wages is not clear from this data.
126 See, e.g., Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99 (indicating 99% membership among teachers in the Norfolk Public Schools); Interview with David Pulliam, supra note
99 (describing success of Richmond Fire Fighters in obtaining wages and retirement benefits
comparable to the best in the nation); Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz, supra note 99
(describing success of Richmond Education Association); IAFF Local 2068, Fairfax County,
President's Message, http://www.fairfaxfirefighters.org/index.cfm?section= l1 &pagenum= 131
(last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (indicating that the Fairfax County local union has over 1700
members, staffing over 35 fire stations in the suburbs of Washington, D.C.); VPFF, VPFF
Member Locals, http://www.vpff.org/Membership/MemberLocals.htm (last visited Nov. 16,
2008) (listing local unions in Virginia); VPFF, Who are the Virginia ProfessionalFire Fighters, supra note 99 (indicating that over 6000 firefighters and paramedics are represented by the
VPFF).
127 By comparison among 96 sheriff's offices in Virginia, there is only one active local
union although several more are chartered. Interview with Kevin Pittman, Secretary of Local
5016, International Union of Police Associations (June 16, 2006). Organizing among sheriffs
deputies has been difficult because of the lack of collective bargaining and the lack of civil
service protection for the deputies. Id. Furthermore, the Sheriffs Association is a strong
political force which opposes legislative initiatives of the unions. Id.
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existence of these unions as professional associations with substantial
membership prior to widespread unionization in government. It has been
more difficult for unions to organize effectively at the state level' 28 and
in smaller localities. While unions that have been able to build effective,
politically savvy organizations have prospered, many employees remain
without any union representation. Although some employees would not
choose union representation regardless of the state of the law, there are
likely other employees who would prefer union representation, yet currently have none.' 29 In addition, a downside to the lack of collective
bargaining and the reliance on personal relationships to uphold agreements is, in most cases, the absence of formal written documentation of
agreements. 130 When union leadership changes, institutional memory
3
may be lost and the status of agreements may be cast into doubt.' '
Specific salary data for some job categories suggest that, compared
to Illinois, in the less unionized environment of Virginia, average pay is
lower. 132 For example, as of 2007, teachers in Illinois were the sixth
highest paid in the country, while teachers in Virginia were ranked twentieth.' 3 3 While other data on teacher salaries, both public and private,
shows a slight advantage in wages for middle school teaching positions
in Virginia, other jobs frequently unionized elsewhere, such as police and

128 See Interview with Donald Baylor, supra note 99 (describing difficulty in organizing
state employees).
129 See Richard B. Freeman, Through Public Sector Eyes: Employee Attitudes toward
Public Sector Labor Relations in the U.S., in PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF

TRANSITION 59, 60, 71-72 (Dale Belman et al. eds., 1996) (showing that 39% of the public
sector nonunion workers in the survey, primarily from one southern state, would vote for union
representation, more than their private sector counterparts despite the higher rate of unionization in the public sector); Webb, supra note 69, at 66-68.
130 See Interview with Michael Mohler, supra note 105.
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION SURVEY 42-45, 68-73 (2006), http://www.aft.org/salary/2006/download/PECompSurvey06.pdf (listing average annual base salary):

Correctional Officers
Correctional Officer Sr./Lead
Teacher, State Institution
Licensed Practical Nurse
Registered Nurse

Illinois

Virginia

$44,252
$61,851
$52,897
$38,891
$59,795

$22,188 - $45,539
$29,167
$42,014
$34,517
$43,992

Because these were state jobs and public sector unionization is very low in Virginia, this may
well reflect a significant wage premium resulting from unionization. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, infra note 134 and accompanying text (showing lower mean wages for police
and sheriffs officers and firefighters in Virginia). The largest gap is for police and sheriffs
officers where unions have had limited success in Virginia. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
133 See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF TEACHER SALARY TRENDS, 2007, at 16, http://www.aft.org/salary/2007/download/AFr2007SalarySurvey.
pdf.
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firefighters, rank far lower on the pay scale in Virginia than they do in
Illinois. 134 Average wages overall in the public sector are higher in Virginia, however. 135 The average wage data does not control for the type
of job and the higher average salaries in Virginia may be explained by a
larger number of jobs in higher paying job categories.
It is clear that there are significant difficulties for unions in states
where bargaining is outlawed. Union membership in such states is significantly lower than in more favorable legal environments, and the
wages for many of the same positions in those states are lower as well.
Nevertheless, some unions have survived in hostile legal climates such as
Virginia, and some have even prospered. For example, it is interesting
that public sector union membership in Virginia is higher than national
private sector union membership although federal law is less hostile to
collective bargaining. Clearly then, the law is not the only factor. The
next section examines possible explanations for the different legal
regimes.
III.

ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIFFERENCES

As noted by Kearney & Carnevale in Labor Relations in the Public
Sector, the relationship between legal bargaining policy and unionization
levels is a chicken and egg problem. 136 Joseph Slater makes this same
point in his study of the history of public sector unionization. 37 The
existence of collective bargaining laws clearly affects the extent of
unionization.1 38 Illinois and Virginia follow this pattern, with much
higher unionization in Illinois. Virginia's loss of union membership between 1972 and 1978, a year after the elimination of lawful collective
134 Compare U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAY 2007
STATE

OCCUPATIONAL

EMPLOYMENT AND

WAGE

ESTIMATES, ILLINOIS, available at http://

data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/oes/current/oes-il.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008), with U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAY 2007 STATE OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES, VIRGINIA, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/

oes/current/oes va.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (listing annual mean wages, not limited to
public employment):

Secondary School Teachers
Middle School Teachers
Elementary School Teachers
Police and Sheriff's patrol officers
Firefighters

Illinois

Virginia

$63,640
$52,630
$54,760
$59,110
$47,280

$56,740
$53,560
$54,190
$46,990
$42,880

Teacher data in this survey did not include special education and vocational education teachers. Id. The largest gap is for police and sheriffs officers, where unions in Virginia have had
limited success. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 44, 97, and accompanying text.
136 See KEARNEY wITH CARNEVALE, supra note 4, at 29.
137 See SLATER, supra note 8, at 194.
138 Id.
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bargaining in the public sector, also illustrates the effect of law on union
membership. 39 On the other hand, strong unions can exert political
pressure that leads to favorable changes in the law. Public sector unions
in Illinois were active long before collective bargaining legislation was
enacted. 140 The unions helped legislators defeat unfavorable legislation
and helped those legislators enact favorable collective bargaining
laws. 14 1 Unions have continued to promote legislative change, resulting
in collective bargaining laws that are more union-friendly than the fed142
eral private sector legislation.
Virginia's unions have not been without legislative victories. While
collective bargaining legislation has eluded them, a statutory grievance
procedure, which allows representation by unions, provides some protection to employees. The creation of this grievance procedure, growing as
it did out of legislative commissions that were established to consider
collective bargaining legislation, almost certainly was an effort to construct a system that would provide employees with some protection that
might relieve the pressure for collective bargaining rights. 143 Other legislation promoted by unions has become law. For example, while
AFSCME has a relatively small membership in Virginia, it successfully
pushed for legislation improving the retirement benefits of corrections
officers, many of whom are active in the union.144
Kearney and Carnevale single out the "Sunbelt states" for particular
consideration in analyzing the determinants of union strength. 145 They
note that despite the presence of characteristics that have been associated
with unionization in other regions (e.g., strong levels of urbanization and
industrialization), unionization has lagged in the southern states, a fact
146
that they attribute to political culture and resistance by employers.
The "traditionalistic" culture of the South, which is elitist and hierarchical, is hostile to unions and generally favors business. 147 Similarly, the
conservative political ideology that is prevalent in the South impedes
139 See Felker et al., supra note 95, at 9 (showing Virginia's change in union membership
from 38.5% of the public sector workforce in 1972 to 19.5% in 1978, and attributing it to the
negative legal climate). Notably, while the Virginia Supreme Court decision was in January
1977, the efforts to eliminate collective bargaining began earlier. See Webb, supra note 69, at
60; Carlton & Johnson, supra note 89, at 268-69.
140 Both collective bargaining statutes grandfathered bargaining about subjects previously
negotiated and embodied in collective bargaining agreements. See 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4
(IELRA) (2006); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/4 (IPLRA) (2006).
141 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 13-39 and accompanying text.
143 See Interview with Guy Horsley, supra note 105.
144 See Interview with Donald Baylor, supra note 99.
145 See KEARNEY wrrI-H CARNEVALE, supra note 4, at 32.
146 See id.
147 See id.
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union growth and strength. 148 Kearney and Carnevale conclude: "In
most of the Sunbelt, a vicious cycle seems to be present in which the
traditionalistic political culture and the absence of public union strength
diminish the chances of new collective bargaining legislation, while in
the absence of a favorable legal environment union membership gains
remain arduous."' 149 Carlton and Johnson, who surveyed the attitudes of
teachers and school board members on issues relating to public employee
bargaining for their article Teacher-BoardRelations in Virginia:A Case
of Perceptual Discontinuity, noted the historically grounded and "deepseated antipathy felt by southerners toward labor unions and union-like
50
organizations." 1
Felker, Griffith, and Durant also looked at union determinants in the
public sector in the South in their article Public Sector Unionization in
the South: An Agenda for Research.15 1 They placed the southern states
into four categories based on the authors' analysis of the effect of the
size of public sector employment on unionization, which they identify as
a key determinant. 152 Virginia follows a relatively unique pattern, joined
only by Texas, in which unionization reached a peak and then began to
decline despite growth in public sector employment. 153 The authors concluded that the hostile legal climate in Virginia and Texas caused the
states to vary from the normal pattern of strong association between the
growth of public sector employment and growth of unionization.' 54 Accordingly, the authors posited that significant public sector employment
is an important, but not sufficient determinant of unionization. 155 The
legal climate also plays an important role in restricting union growth de156
spite gains in public sector employment.
In his book, Public Workers, Joseph Slater conducted a more focused legal analysis based on the history of public sector unionization. 157
Slater looked at the role of the law in public sector unionization, filling a
gap in the scholarly analysis which had focused extensively on the role
of law in the private sector. 158 Slater concluded that the law historically
148 See id.
149 Id.

at 33.
150 Carlton & Johnson, supra note 89, at 276-77 (citing W. J. Cash's Mind of the South
which discussed the anger that many southerners expressed toward textile strikers in the
1930s).
151 See Felker et al., supra note 95, at 9. Although the analysis is dated, the authors
examined an important time period in Virginia's history during which collective bargaining
was outlawed and contracts voided. See id.
152 See id. at 6.
153 See id. at 8.
154 See id. at 8-9.
155 See id. at 11.
156 See id.
157 See SLATER, supra note 8, at 5-10.
158 See id. at 6.
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played an important role in frustrating the efforts of public employees to
unionize. 159 Slater identified three significant factors that caused judges
to apply the law in ways unfavorable to unionization: judges were "hostile to labor"; constrained by state structures and legal doctrines; and interpreted the term "union" inaccurately due to fear of strikes, despite the
assurances of unions and the predominant history to the contrary. 160
Each of these factors is demonstrably evident when comparing the law
and its impact in Virginia and Illinois, confirming that the pattern Slater
observed historically continues today.
The judicial hostility toward unions in Virginia is reflected in the
Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Arlington County. 16 1 The court
stated that there was no "support for the proposition that collective bargaining by the boards is necessary to promote the public interest." 162 By
way of contrast, courts in Illinois allowed unions to play a significant
role in the public sector even before the enactment of the collective bargaining statutes.1 63 In Virginia, the at-will employment doctrine is repeatedly described by courts as a strong presumption, not to be overcome
easily, however sympathetic an employee's case and however poorly the
employer behaves. 164 In the area of workers' compensation, Virginia's
laws are among the most business-friendly in the nation, restricting
workers' ability to obtain benefits in several areas where most other

159 See id. at 95.
160 See id. at 7.
161 See Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 232 S.E.2d 30, 44-45 (Va.
1977).
162 Id. at 43.
163 See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Cook County Coil Teachers Union, 343 N.E.2d 473 (I11.
1976) (upholding arbitration award in favor of teachers based on collective bargaining agreement in effect in 1971); Naperville Police Union v. City of Naperville, 422 N.E.2d 869 (i11.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1981).
164 See, e.g., County of Giles v. Wines, 546 S.E.2d 721, 725 (Va. 2001) (reversing the
lower court's decision that the county's personnel policy created a binding contract to terminate only for cause). The manual in Giles said the "employee may be discharged for inefficiency, insubordination, misconduct, or other just cause." Id. at 73. The Virginia Supreme
Court found that such language did not rebut the presumption because it did not say that
employees will only be fired for just cause or cannot be fired without just cause. See id. The
court also precluded reliance on any evidence other than the manual. See id. at 79-80. See
also Cave Hill Corp. v. Hiers, 570 S.E.2d 790 (Va. 2002) (relying on the strong at-will doctrine to reverse trial
court's decision to send to the jury a case challenging the employee's
termination, finding that the contract was unambiguous although it included both a specific
contract term and a thirty day notice provision for termination of the agreement); Willey v.
Roanoke County, No. 702CV00901, 2005 WL 1719948 (W.D. Va. July 21, 2005) (relying on
presumption of at-will employment to defeat employee's claim based on handbook provisions); Mizell v. Sara Lee Corp, No. Civ. A. 2:05CV129, 2005 WL 16680J6 (E.D. Va. June 9,
2005) (finding at-will relationship despite claims of intentional employer misrepresentations
that the handbook was binding).
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states award such benefits.1 65 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, the federal circuit court covering Virginia, has a reputation as the most conservative appeals court in the country. 166 The Fourth
Circuit's decisions on labor matters reflect a suspicion of unions and
a
reluctance to rule against employers except in the clearest of cases. 167
Hostility is not limited to judges, of course, but rather judges reflect
the expressed views of the most powerful and vocal citizens. 168 Public
officials and candidates running for office in Virginia from both political
parties proclaim allegiance to both the right-to-work law and the ban
on
165 See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. Larson, Larson's
Worker's Compensation Law
§ 103.02 (2008) (indicating that most states do not hold intentional
acts to be accidents under
workers' compensation laws, permitting employees to sue employers
for intentional torts); cf.
Haddon v. Metropolitan Life, 389 S.E.2d 712, 714 (Va. 1990) (finding
intentional tort to be
accident). See also LARSON & LARSON, supra at § 50.01 (noting that
most states award benefits for gradually occurring injuries); cf. Stenrich Group v. Jemmott,
467 S.E.2d 795 (Va.
1996) (holding that gradually incurred injuries are not covered by
workers' compensation in
Virginia). See also Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Attorney
General, Press Releases, July 16, 2007, http://www.oag.state.va.us/PRESS-RELEASES/NewsArchive/
071607_Business.htmi (last visited Aug. 18, 2007) (noting Virginia's
recognition as the number two state in the country for favorable business liability climate);
Steven B. Hantler, Risky
Business: The Annual Boardroom Guide to Litigation in the 50 States,
Directorship, June/July
2007, at 52-53, http://www.legalreforminthenews.com/2007PDFS/AJPDirectorshipGuideState
LegalClimates_6-28-07.pdf.
166 See Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model
of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 1999, at Al (stating that by 1999, the Fourth Circuit had "quietly
but steadily become
the boldest conservative court in the nation in the view of scholars,
lawyers and many of its
own members"); see also Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2003, (Magazine), at 40 (stating that the Fourth Circuit is considered
the "shrewdest, most
aggressively conservative federal appeals court in the nation"); Carl
Tobias, A Note on the
Neutral Assignment of Federal Appellate Judges, 39 SAN DIEoO
L. REv. 151, 152 (2002)
(stating empirical research confirmed several studies which found that
a majority of the court's
members "invoke the rehearing en banc mechanism to reverse three-judge
panel opinions
which the majority considers too liberal politically").
167 For example, in two studies dealing with enforcement
of NLRB decisions, the Fourth
Circuit was one of the circuits least likely to enforce the Board's orders.
See Terry Bethel &
Catherine Melfi, Judicial Enforcement of NLRB Bargaining Orders:
What Influences the
Courts?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 139, 157, 162 (1988) (finding that
the Fourth Circuit was the
third lowest court in enforcing NLRB bargaining orders as remedies
for employer unfair labor
practices in election campaigns); Catherine Fayette, JudicialDecisions
on an Employer's Duty
to Bargain: Objective Analyses or Personal Biases?, 50 WAYNE
L. REv. 1221, 1239-40
(2005) (finding in study of enforcement of NLRB decisions ordering
employers to bargain that
the more conservative courts, including the Fourth Circuit, reversed
for the employer more
often).
168 Cf. Editorial, Prosperity Busters, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH,
Apr. 14, 2008, at A 14
(suggesting that most private employees do not want unions; that unions
will make it hard for
American businesses to compete; and that election of Democrats at
the national level, who are
"union pawns," will destroy the economy and eliminate
right-to-work laws, which will, in
turn, devastate Virginia's economy). Notably, Virginia has been ranked
as the best state for
business by Forbes.com for three years in a row. See Tierney Plumb,
Virginia named 'best
state to do business' by Forbes.com, WASHINGTON Bus. J., (Aug. 1,
2008), available at http://
washington.bizjoumals.com/washington/stories/2008/07/28/daily59.html.
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public employee collective bargaining. 169 Recently, when a Democratic
governor sought to appoint the president of the state AFL-CIO to the
position of Secretary of the Commonwealth, 170 public statements by
members of the legislature and letters to the editors of local papers reflected anti-union views and fears of union power in a state where little
exists. 171 The appointment was derailed and the AFL-CIO president was
169 See, e.g., Warren Fiske, House Panel Rejects Kaine Nominee for Cabinet Post, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://hamptonroads.com/node/74981 (noting
that Governor Kaine, a Democrat, supports the right-to-work law); Editorial, Democrats Favor
Unions Over Growth, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 30, 2008, at A12 (criticizing legislation that would have compromised the right-to-work law and suggesting that Democrats
outside the state would undermine the law and thus weaken the economy and the free enterprise system). See also Kurt Badenhausen, Virginia: The Best State For Business,
FORBES.COM (Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/08/15/virginia-business-climate cz kb_0815virginia.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (quoting Democratic Governor Kaine praising the bipartisan tradition of keeping the legal and regulatory climate
favorable for business).
170 The Secretary of the Commonwealth helps the governor in appointments to various
state boards and commissions, vets appointees to insure compliance with various state laws,
and handles various official documentations for the state, including commissioning notaries
and authorizing the use of the state seal. See Secretary of the Commonwealth, What We Do,
http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 4, 2008); Secretary of the
Commonwealth, State Government Information, http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/
StateGovernment/index.cfm (last visited March 4, 2008); Secretary of the Commonwealth,
Official State Documents, http://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/OfficialDocuments/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
171 See Michael D. Shear, GOP Delegates Stymie Kaine's Cabinet Choice, WASH. POST,
Mar. 8,2006, at Al (quoting Del. Timothy Hugo stating "LeBlanc's appointment would lead
to a 'unionization of the state workforce"'); Fiske, supra note 169. Dan LeBlanc's appointment was the only cabinet appointment ever to be rejected by the legislature since the initiation
of the cabinet system. See Fiske, supra note 169. Reactions in the General Assembly were
hostile: "'Other than the governor himself, the secretary of the commonwealth has the greatest
power to affect policy of any other position in the commonwealth,' said Del. Timothy Hugo,
R-Fairfax. 'He would possess the ability to fill these positions entirely with people who share
his views on right to work.' Republicans complained that LeBlanc over the years had made
derogatory comments about several of Virginia's largest employers. Del. John Cosgrove, RChesapeake, noted that LeBlanc once called Newport News Shipbuilding a "plantation." Cosgrove said LeBlanc's appointment would "send the wrong message" to businesses considering
locating in Virginia." Id. Notably, LeBlanc found it necessary to disavow any intent to undermine the right to work law in an effort to obtain General Assembly support for his appointment. Id. The interrogation of LeBlanc in front of the General Assembly was revealing.
Del. Terrie Lynne Suit (R-Virginia Beach) led the questioning, citing an article in an
online publication, the People's Weekly World, which she said quoted LeBlanc as
saying that white executives of Newport News Shipbuilding ran the shipyard and its
black workers like "a plantation." She said the site, which bills itself as "a progressive, leftist, socialist and communist weekly," quoted LeBlanc as comparing 'rightto-work' lawmakers with segregationists. "How will you reach out to Newport
News Shipbuilding and work with them ... given that you have no respect for that
corporation?" Suit asked.
In the 75-minute session, lawmakers queried LeBlanc about being arrested during a
United Mine Workers strike in the 1980s. LeBlanc said he was arrested along with
about 5,000 other people. "You affirmatively disobeyed a lawful order. That's what
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placed in a job which did not require approval of the General
Assembly. 172
The issue of public sector bargaining reared its head again in the
2008 legislative session. In an unprecedented procedural move, the
sponsor of a bill to allow bargaining was denied the right to withdraw the
bill, forcing a vote by the full House of Delegates. 173 The purpose of this
rare move was to force Democrats in the Virginia House to vote on the
bill; if the Democrats voted against the bill, it would alienate their labor
supporters and if the Democrats voted for the bill, the vote could be used
against them in next election. 174 The Democrats refused to vote altogether, illustrating once again that even Democrats with labor support are
reluctant to support labor issues in Virginia.1 75 As for the Republicans,
the Majority Leader of the House, in speaking about the bill, echoed the
earlier associations of strikes and public sector bargaining,1 76 asserting
that the Democrats were leading Virginia toward the demise of the rightto-work law and the consequent end of Virginia's status as the best state
in the nation in which to do business. 177 Delegate Griffith's speech asserted that a vote on the bill would show whether the delegates were for
Virginia or for the unions, clearly implying that one could not support
unions and public sector bargaining and still support the state. 178 Conversely, in Illinois, labor has a strong voice in the legislature, pushing for
favorable legislation and opposing legislation with negative conse-

you are telling me?" asked Del. David B. Albo (R-Fairfax). "That's correct," LeBlanc said and added that it was an act of civil disobedience.
Michael D. Shear, Va. Delegates Question "Right-to-Work" Views, WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 2006,

at B05.
172

See Virginia.gov, Senior Advisor to the Governor for Workforce, Biography of Daniel

G. LeBlanc, http://www.workforce.virginia.gov/Officelnfo/LeBlancBio.cfm

4, 2008);

VA. CODE ANN.

(last visited Mar.

§ 2.2-435.6B (providing for governor to designate senior staff mem-

ber from the governor's office to handle responsibilities of chief workforce development

officer).
173 See WVEC.com, Virginia House Floor Clash Provokes Partisan Meltdown, Jan. 24,
2008, http://www.wvec.com/news/topstories/stories/wveclocal0 12408politics.546ddf56.html
(last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
174
175

See id.
See id.

176 See infra notes 193- 201 and accompanying text.
177 See Stand Up and Vote!, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZD6o3uHcQY (last vis-

ited Aug. 18, 2008) (Majority Leader Morgan Griffith calling on Democrats to cast a vote).
178 See id.
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quences for labor. 179 Illinois Democratic legislators and other officials
80
do not fear association with union-supported legislation.'
The laws and state structures in Virginia and Illinois also differ,
providing support for Slater's notion that laws and state structures affect

public sector unionization. An obvious difference is that bargaining in
Virginia is outlawed, while in Illinois, it is not only permitted but encouraged. As noted above, Virginia follows the Dillon rule, which restricts the authority of local government to those powers expressly
conferred by the state or those conferred by necessary implication.' 8'
The Arlington County court relied on the Dillon Rule to find that local
government entities had no authority to bargain collectively with unions
despite their expressed desire to do so as reflected in the existing agreements. 182 Illinois has adopted Home Rule, which allows local governments to exercise those powers not clearly and expressly withheld by the
state.1 83 Thus, local governments that choose to bargain with unions can
do so, even in the absence of a statute authorizing collective bargaining.
Historically, bargaining occurred well prior to the enactment of the bar84
gaining laws.1
The nondelegability doctrine, long used to preclude public sector
collective bargaining, persists in Virginia despite its virtual abandonment
in many states. 185 Opponents of bargaining legislation have used the
nondelegability doctrine to justify the refusal to permit negotiations, arguing that the legislature cannot delegate its responsibility to govern the
relations of public sector employees through bargaining nor can it permit
179 See, e.g., Kerry L. Smith, Pro-labor,Anti-employer 'Replacement Worker' Law Effective Jan. 1, ILL. Bus. J. (Dec. 15, 2003), available at http://www.ibjonline.com/printreplacementworkerlaw.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008); Dave McKinney, Illinois Labor Flexes New
Political Muscle, STATELINE.ORG Dec. 6, 2002, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&languageld=l&contentld=15090 (last visited Aug. 18, 2008); Pat
Guinane, Labor Friendly, ILLINOIS ISSUES (Jun. 2004), available at http://illinoisissuesarchive.uis.edu/features/2004june/labor.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
180 See Smith, supra note 179; McKinney, supra note 179; Guinane, supra note 179.
181 See Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 232 S.E.2d at 39-40 (Va.
1977).
182 See id. at 43.
183 See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6; City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank & Trust
Co., 845 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (I1. App. Ct. 2006) ("The intent and purpose of the home rule
provisions [in the Illinois Constitution] is to limit severely the judiciary's authority to preempt
home rule powers [of municipalities] through judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative
intent."); Neri Bros. Constr. v. Vill. of Evergreen Park, 841 N.E.2d 148, 152 (II. App. Ct.
2005) (holding that "any limitation on the power of home rule units by the General Assembly
must be specific, clear, and unambiguous. Absent such a limitation, we will not find
preemption.").
184 See Clark & O'Brien, supra note 10, at 199.
185 See, e.g., Independence-Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d
131, 136 (Mo. 2007).
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the executive branch or administrative agencies to do so. 186 The Virginia
Supreme Court relied on the doctrine in two important cases involving
school teachers. In School Board of City of Richmond v. Parham, the
court held that school boards could not be required to submit to binding
arbitration of grievances because arbitration improperly delegated to the
arbitrator the authority that belonged to local school boards. 18 7 Subsequently, the court relied on the nondelegability doctrine in Russell
County School Board v. Anderson to find that the decisions of statutory
fact-finding panels in disciplinary proceedings for school teachers are not
binding on school boards. 18 8 By way of contrast, the Illinois bargaining
statutes require contracts to contain provisions for arbitration of grievances.' 89 In addition, Illinois education law provides for binding decisions of hearing officers in teacher discipline cases, subject to limited
appellate review.1 90 Finally, Virginia remains a right-to-work state,
19 1
while Illinois is not.
Slater's third factor, the judicial misunderstanding of public sector
unions, focuses primarily on judges' unwillingness to recognize and acknowledge that public sector unions largely eschewed strikes.1 92 As
Slater documents, this factor played an historic role in the limited growth
of public sector unions.' 93 The reports of the Commissions that studied
the rights of public employees preceding the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision in Arlington County reflect the fear of strikes. The 1973 Commission, which recommended legislation making contracts enforceable
and encouraged a policy of providing a way for public employees to
express their views to their employers, also contained a recommendation
to enact legislation to deter strikes.' 94 The 1974 Commission, which recommended legislation making negotiated agreements enforceable, was
accompanied by a five member dissent stating, "[o]rganization and collective bargaining is meaningless without the concurrent right of eco186 See 1975 Commission Report, supra note 86, at 6-7. The report quotes the 1947
decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539, 545
(Mo. 1947), in support of its position. 1975 Commission Report, supra note 86, at 7. The
Missouri Supreme Court recently overturned Clouse, holding that the Missouri constitution
protects the right of public employees to bargain collectively. See Independence Sch. Dist.,
223 S.W.3d at 137.
187 See School Bd. of City of Richmond v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 468, 472 (Va. 1978).
188 See Russell County School Board v. Anderson, 384 S.E.2d 598, 604-05 (Va. 1989).
189 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/8 (2006); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10(c) (2006).
190 See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-12 (2006).
191 See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-58 (2005); National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation Inc., http://www.nrtw.org/ (last visited March 4, 2008). Indeed, the headquarters of the
Right to Work Foundation is located in Virginia. Id.
192 See SLATER, supra note 8, at 82.
193 See id. at 7.
194 See 1973 Commission Report, supra note 71, at 3.
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nomic action and always leads to work stoppages whether lawful or
195
not."
The rhetoric about strikes escalated in the 1975 report, in which the
Commission divided equally on the need for bargaining legislation. The
Commissioners all agreed that strikes in the public sector should be prohibited. 196 Those opposed to legislation that would authorize voluntary
collective bargaining stated:
Thus, the question involved in the issue of public employee collective bargaining is whether it is necessary or
desirable to equalize the bargaining power between public employees and public employers by encouraging the
organization of employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining-in full knowledge of the fact that the process does not equalize anything unless it is supported by
a 'right to strike' with protection from reprisal ....
States which have adopted collective bargaining or meet
and confer legislation for public employees have experienced an increase in the number of strikes as a result,
even though such strikes were unlawful. Thus, the process of collective bargaining invites strikes and threats
thereof and no legislation has been found which can prevent such strikes-action which challenges the very sov197
ereignty of government.
As Slater has carefully documented, this same fear, using the specter of the Boston police strike of 1919, was used in an earlier era to
198
frustrate the efforts of public sector unions.
Even the proponents of legislation authorizing bargaining in Virginia felt the need to address the strike issue. Of the ten legislative recommendations, five addressed enhanced and severe penalties for strikes,
including authorizing employers to impose additional penalties beyond
those required by the legislature. 199 In addition, the proponents supported their call for legislation by suggesting that government officials'
refusal to meet with employees who had legitimate concerns had caused
employees to seek assistance from "more militant national unions." 20 0

195 1974 Commission Report, supra note 59, at 12 (emphasis added).
196 See 1975 Commission Report, supra note 86, at 6.
197 Id. at 5-6. As noted previously, supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text, there was
no increase in the number of strikes in Illinois when bargaining legislation was passed.
198 See SLATER, supra note 8, at 27-38, 81-84.
199 See 1975 Commission Report, supra note 86, at 14-15, 16-17.
200 Id. at 18.
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Further, the proponents argued that a rightful denial of the right to strike
20 1
would require providing some mechanism for employee input.
As indicated above, unions in Virginia are largely in the same place
today as public sector unions generally were in an era when the courts
and legislatures, not to mention at least some members of the public,
were hostile to public sector unionization. 20 2 The factors identified by
Slater to explain the delay in the development of public sector bargaining
in the first sixty-two years of the twentieth century continue to discourage bargaining in Virginia. The interrelated factors of a hostile legal
climate, traditional hierarchical culture, and conservative political ideology have combined to limit unionization in Virginia's public sector. As
is true historically, however, some unions have been successful despite
these barriers. 20 3 In Illinois, with a more favorable legal and political
climate, collective bargaining and unionization have been widespread
and successful. 20 4 The success of unionization, aided by the favorable

legal climate, has enabled unions to achieve legislation that is even more
protective of employee rights and bargaining. 20 5 The next section will
explore the implications of this analysis for the private sector and other
states in the public sector.
IV.

LESSONS FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR DIVIDE

Having explored the distinctions between Illinois and Virginia and
possible explanations for those distinctions, the next question is whether
there are any other lessons to be drawn from this analysis for either public sector or private sector labor relations.
A.

The Private Sector

There is a longstanding debate among scholars and legislators about
the role that the law has played in the decline of unionization in the
private sector. 20 6 While the law is certainly not the only contributing
201 See id. at 22.

202 For historical documentation of public sector unionism in the era from 1900-1962,
which reveals that unions in that era used many of the same strategies for success as current
unions in Virginia, see generally SLATER, supra note 8.
203 Slater has complied data on the historical success of public sector unions. See id. For
union successes in Virginia, see supra notes 100-127 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 42- 51 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 15- 34 and accompanying text.
206 See, e.g., DUNLOP COrMMISSION, supra note 18, at 8-13; CRAVER, supra note 18, at

34-55; GOULD IV, supra note 18, at 20-25; WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note
18, at 239; Charles B. Craver, The NationalLabor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve
Industrial Democracy, 34 ARiz. L. REV. 397, 401-02 (1992); Estlund, supra note 37, at
1527-43; Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair,Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 62-68 (1993); Michael C. Harper, A Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L.J. 103, 110-15 (2001);
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factor in unions' loss of membership in the private sector, the comparison of Virginia and Illinois suggests that the law does have an effect on
unionization rates. In Illinois, where the law is more favorable, unions
have thrived in the public sector, whereas in Virginia they have struggled. However, higher unionization rates also lead to more favorable
laws. Thus, where the law is not favorable, successful efforts to spread
unionization may later lead to changes in the law, as unionized employees gain political power. The analysis also demonstrates that while legislation that authorizes bargaining may encourage and promote
unionization, unions can succeed in representing employees without
favorable legislation. Given the decline of legal protection for unionization in the private sector and the ineffectiveness of the NLRA, 20 7 can the
success of some unions in Virginia's public sector provide a blueprint for
private sector unions, helping them to reverse the long decline in union
density?
First, it must be noted that there are significant differences between
the public sector and the private sector. Most public sector employees
have some legal protection against termination, while most private sector
employees are terminable at-will. 20 8 Thus, the risks of termination for
attempting to unionize are greater in the private sector and the fear of job
loss may be a greater deterrent to unionization. Furthermore, public employers in general tend to be less hostile to unionization than private
employers, 20 9 although, as noted above, negative attitudes toward unionization in Virginia are widespread. Nevertheless, those employers that
deal with unions in Virginia in the absence of legal requirements have
concluded that the benefits outweigh the costs. These differences may
help explain the fact that unionization is now higher in Virginia's public
2 10
sector, where bargaining is outlawed, than it is in the private sector.
Second, much of the success of public sector unions in Virginia has
come through the political process. While private sector employees and
unions can obtain important benefits through the political process as
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 575, 575 (1992); Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 18, at 1771-86.
207 See Cynthia Estlund, The Story of NLRB v. Washington Aluminum: Labor Law as
Employment Law, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 175, 208-11 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian
Lester eds., 2007); Liebman, supra note 37, at 570.
208 JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS

105

(2004).
209 Id. at 100-01, 115.
210 Public employee union membership in Virginia is 9.3%. See HIRSCH & MACPHERSON,
supra note 43, at 35, while national private sector membership is 7.6%. Id. at 12. Private
sector membership in Virginia is even lower, 2.6%. Id. at 35. Another factor to consider is
that the public sector numbers in Virginia include employees who can bargain lawfully under
federal law despite Virginia's prohibition on bargaining for state and local government employees. See Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7134 (2000).
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well, the process is far less direct. Employees in the private sector can
rarely directly influence their employers with political activity, while
public sector employees have the potential to do so because their employers are almost always elected. At the local level, the influence is far
more direct for groups like teachers, firefighters, and police officers who
can participate actively in campaigns for school board members, city
council representatives, county board members, and mayors. Finally, it
is worth noting that the most successful public sector unions in Virginia
did not start from scratch under a regime where collective bargaining
was clearly unlawful. Instead, like many public sector unions in other
areas, public sector unions in Virginia evolved from professional associations, 21 and began to engage in collective bargaining when it was not
clearly prohibited by law. 21 2 When the legal regime changed, there was
a large loss of membership, but some unions survived and eventually
thrived. Thus, the parallel with the private sector is far from exact. Nevertheless, some lessons might be drawn.
While many Virginia public sector employees have greater job security than most private sector employees, some public sector employees
in Virginia do not have the same job security as similarly situated public
sector employees in other states. For example, as noted above, in tenure
proceedings, a Virginia school board can reject the findings of neutral
hearing officers. 21 3 Nevertheless, the employment protection for Virginia teachers far exceeds that of most private employees. A comparison
can be made, however, between the strategies of successful Virginia unions and those of worker centers in the private sector, as worker centers
represent employees with little job security.
In recent years, there have been substantial efforts to organize and
empower low-wage workers, who often are immigrants, outside the
bounds of traditional labor unions. While these efforts have been supported by traditional unions in some cases, much of the work has been
done by worker advocacy organizations and attorneys. 2 14 One can
scarcely imagine a group with less job security and political clout than
low-wage, immigrant, and in some cases, undocumented workers. They
are easily replaced, may risk deportation, do not have money to contribSee GRODIN ET AL., supra note 208, at 16.
See Webb, supra note 69, at 61; Richards & Carlton, supra note 69, at 359; Felker,
supra note 95, at 4, 9.
213 See Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 468, 473 (Va. 1978).
214 See generally JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMI211

212

GRANT RIGHTS

(2005) (describing the Long Island Workplace Project);

JANICE FINE, WORKER

DREAM (2006) (documenting the
work of numerous worker centers around the country); Victor Narro, Finding the Synergy
Between Law and Organization: Experiencesfrom The Streets of Los Angeles, 35 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 339, 340 (2008) (describing two campaigns of worker centers in Los Angeles).
CENTERS: ORGANIZING

COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE
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ute to political candidates, and in some cases, cannot even vote. Yet,
these organizing efforts have not been without success.
Worker centers, based on the nineteenth century model of the mutual benefit society, have been established in many areas. 21 5 Worker
centers are "community-based mediating institutions that provide support
to low wage workers. 2 1 6 These institutions focus on three prongs: service, advocacy, and organizing.2 17 Worker centers have had some documented successes in changing conditions for low-wage workers, through
law and organizing, often working in conjunction with other worker advocacy organizations. 2 18 Workers from Long Island were able to change
New York law, achieving enactment of the Unpaid Wages Prohibition
Act, which improved enforcement of the law requiring payment of wages
for time worked. 2 19 A coalition of worker centers and workers' rights
advocacy organizations was able to obtain unpaid wages, legal relief for
workers discharged for protesting poor and unlawful working conditions,
and agreements to improve working conditions for garment workers, in a
campaign against Forever 21, based in Los Angeles. 220 The campaign
included boycotts, picketing, legal actions, and national speaking tours
22 1
by affected workers.
A similar coalition worked with car wash workers in Los Angeles
222
after discovering many legal violations and other abusive practices.
The coalition successfully represented workers to remedy violations of
wage and hour laws, helped obtain reinstatement for workers fired for
attempting to improve working conditions, and ultimately succeeded in
obtaining legislation to regulate the industry to limit the most abusive
practices. 2 23 As conceived by the advocates, the legislation provided a
vehicle for organizing the car wash workers into a union, a campaign
215 See David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers; Emerging Labor Organizations - Until They
Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 469, 472-73
(2006).
216 FINE, supra note 214, at 2.
217 See id.

218 See generally FiN,, supra note 214 (providing a thorough review and analysis of vari-

ous worker centers).
219 See GORDON, supra note 214, at 8-9; Jennifer Gordon, The Campaignfor the Unpaid
Wages ProhibitionAct: Latino Immigrants Change New York Wage Law I (International Migration Policy Program, Working Papers, Carnegie Paper No. 4, August 1999), available at
http:/lwww.carnegieendowment.orglfileslimp-wp4gordon.pdf (describing the act that significantly increases penalties for unpaid wages from a 25% civil fine to a 200 percent civil fine
and from a misdemeanor with a maximum $10,000 penalty to a felony with a maximum
$20,000 penalty). The law also provides workers with more tools to collect back pay owed.
GORDON, supra.
220 See Narro, supra note 214, at 344.
221 See id. at 353.
222 See id. at 344.
223 See id. at 362.
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which was undertaken by a traditional labor union, the United Steelwork224
ers of America.
These campaigns illustrate several different models of combining
legal strategies with organizing to achieve protection for workers. Like
the worker centers, public sector unions in Virginia, without the ability to
strike or to negotiate binding collective bargaining agreements, 22 5 use
similar strategies of lobbying, service (including legal actions), and organizing to accomplish their goals. Traditional unions utilizing these
strategies have some advantages over the worker centers. One of the
major issues facing the worker centers is financing. 2 26 Traditional unions can rely on member dues for financial stability if they are able to
organize workers effectively or can lawfully negotiate a union security
clause requiring payment of dues by bargaining unit members.

Worker centers and the most successful Virginia unions share an
additional characteristic. The most successful unions in Virginia are primarily those in workplaces where the employees share not only an employer, but a profession.2 27 Many worker centers focus on employees
from particular ethnic groups. 228 Thus, both groups organize employees
with shared characteristics that create bonds which may aid in organizing.2 29 Without either of these shared traits, nontraditional private sector
2 30
organizing may be more difficult.
Finally, in the private sector, there is a concern that organizations
engaged in organizing and legal actions for workers rights may run afoul
of the NLRA. David Rosenfeld has pointed out the possibility that organizations like worker centers may be found to be labor organizations
under the NLRA and thus be subject to a number of legal restrictions

under the statute. 2 31 In addition, if a union is trying to organize employees under the NLRA, providing legal assistance to workers may be considered an improper inducement for union support.2 32 These risks do not
exist where collective bargaining is banned, most notably, the Virginia
public sector.
See id. at 368.
While the workers affiliated with worker centers typically retain the fight to strike, the
centers rarely choose such a strategy. See FINE, supra note 214, at 257-59.
226 See Rosenfeld, supra note 215, at 479.
227 Even the AFSCME local that has achieved legislative success has a membership that
is composed primarily of employees who share a profession and employer-corrections officers. See supra notes 99, 144, and accompanying text.
228 See Rosenfeld, supra note 215, at 471-72; FtNE, supra note 214, at 42-71.
229 See FINE, supra note 214, at 42-45.
230 For a discussion of some of the challenges of multicultural organizing, see FINE, supra
note 214, at 61-69.
231 See Rosenfeld, supra note 215, at 499-503.
232 See Freund Baking Co. v. N.L.R.B., 165 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Catherine Fisk,
Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57, 60 (2002).
224

225
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Despite these differences between the public and private sectors, the
Virginia experience may provide further support for alternative union
strategies in the private sector. Professor Dau-Schmidt has suggested
that traditional collective bargaining may continue to be effective only
where international competition is not a threat. 233 The success of some
Virginia public sector unions suggests that unions can survive, and in
some cases thrive, without traditional bargaining. Virginia provides a
model for unionization in an uncertain or even hostile legal environment.
By studying the factors that contributed to success in Virginia, unions
may find additional strategies for the private sector.
One factor that Virginia union leaders have stressed is the need for
continual organizing in situations where there is no collective bargaining
agreement and no union security clause. 234 These leaders distinguished
their unions from those in states which authorize bargaining in this regard, suggesting that their counterparts in other states relied on the contracts more heavily and did not feel the same need to engage in constant
organizing and political activity. 2 35 The value of this strategy should not
be lost on unions with collective bargaining agreements, however. While
organizing for support may be essential in a hostile legal environment, it
can also provide valuable benefits for any union. Support from the employees is essential to establish union strength and solidarity for bargaining, grievance actions, and any other activity that the union undertakes.
Indeed, many scholars and union activists are suggesting and experimenting with new union activities that involve employees more directly
in the work of the union. 236 Under this model, the union is not a servicing organization for the members; rather the union is driven by the members themselves and its members' activism leads to more successful
results in disputes with management. 237 The experience of some Virginia unions supports the conclusion that this model can be successful
even where formal bargaining is not permitted.
B.

The Public Sector

The comparison of Virginia and Illinois may offer a blueprint for
public sector labor relations as well. The trajectory of the public sector
233 See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of Collective Representation: The Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 CI.-KENT L. REV. 903, 922 (2007).

234 See supra notes 114- 115 and accompanying text.
235 Interview with Marian Flickinger, supra note 99; Interview with Dena Rosenkrantz,
supra note 99; Interview with David Pulliam, President, supra note 99; Interview with Michael
Mohler, supra note 105.
236 See Michael M. Oswalt, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations,57 DuKE L.J. 691, 718-19 (2007) (highlighting scholarly research and anecdotal evidence from union efforts supporting the value and success of
"relational organizing" and "sustained internal union activism").
237 See id.
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union movement has followed that of the private sector movement (although some years later). While there are certainly some differences between the two, trends in unionization show that in both the private and
public sectors, it rose to similar heights in the years after legalization of
collective bargaining. Private sector union density peaked at 35% in
1954, almost twenty years after the passage of the NLRA, and has been
declining ever since. 2 38 Public sector union density followed a similar
path in the first twenty years after the beginning of legalization in the late
1950s. 239 Since that time, growth has leveled off, but there has not been
a precipitous decline. 240 The steady decline in private sector union density did not begin until the 1980s, however, so it is too early to tell
whether the public sector may follow a similar but perhaps slightly
delayed pattern.
While the pressures of global competition (one of many factors in
the private sector union decline) are less likely to affect public sector
employees, the issue of outsourcing (whether local or international)
poses a very real threat to the jobs of public workers. 24 1 Traditional collective bargaining may continue to be effective only where neither international nor private sector competition is a threat. 242 In workplaces
where traditional collective bargaining is no longer effective, the Virginia model (which uses active and continual organizing, public pressure,
legislative advocacy, and legal action) may provide an alternative approach to thwart the decline of unionization. Since some Virginia unions
have been successful where bargaining is outlawed, their approach may
work effectively where bargaining is permissible but no longer as effective due to external pressures.
Finally, the Virginia experience suggests that at least some employers are willing to work with unions in a cooperative way in the absence
238 See Charles B. Craver, The Clinton Labor Board: Continuing a Tradition of Moderation and Excellence, 16 LAB. LAW. 123, 148 (2000). Private sector union membership stood at
7.6% in 2008. HIRSCH & MACPHERSON, supra note 43, at 12.
239 In 1979, twenty years after the passage of the first state public sector bargaining stat-

ute, public sector union membership reached 37%. See HIRSCH &

MACPHERSON,

supra note

43, at 16.
240 See id. The data book shows membership patterns from 1979-2007 ranging between
a low of 34.3% in 1981 to a high of 38.7% in 1994. In 2008, membership was at 36.8%.
241 While there is significant debate about the advantages and disadvantages of privatiza-

tion of government, there is a significant move toward outsourcing of government operations.
See Ellen Dannin, Counting What Matters: Privatization,People with Disabilitiesand the Cost
of Low-Wage Work, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1348, 1349 (2008); Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization,Publicization,and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
111, 114 (2005); Drury Stevenson, Privatizationof Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARiz. L. REV. 83, 83 (2003); Demetra Smith Nightingale & Nancy M. Pindus, Privatization of Public Social Services, URBAN INSTrruTE, Oct. 15, 1997, http:Il
www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=407023 (last visited July 11, 2008).
242 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 233, at 922.
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of binding collective bargaining. 24 3 While the evidence is purely anecdotal and quite limited, it suggests the possibility that employers may be
more willing to work out agreements with unions when such agreements
are non-binding and the law does not direct the parties to a particular
type of relationship. The risk to the employer posed by an agreement
with the union is obviously reduced if the agreement is not enforceable.
Agreements can be quietly negotiated and compliance may proceed
under the radar of public scrutiny, unlike the situation where negotiations
are public and contracts require legislative approval. Experimental approaches may be tried without fear on either side that an unsuccessful
trial will be set in stone.
Martin Malin and Charles Kerchner make a related point in their
article Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?244 Malin and Kerchner suggest that
traditional collective bargaining, as cabined by the laws authorizing bargaining, results in negotiation of agreements relating to wages and working conditions. 245 Efforts by teachers to obtain a voice in educational
policy are discouraged by existing bargaining laws. 246 Where teachers
seek such a role, they must couch their interest in terms of wages and
working conditions, regardless of their true motivation, because the laws
typically grant them rights to bargain only about teacher working conditions and not issues related to educational policy.2 47 Unions shape their
agendas accordingly, focusing their efforts and their appeals to the membership on the basis of their ability to negotiate higher wages and better
benefits and to protect workers against arbitrary management action. 24 8
Management focuses on resisting the union's demands. Accordingly,
both the employer and the union are discouraged, or at least diverted,
from creating a different kind of workplace, where employees have more
involvement and management and the union work together to achieve
identified objectives and improve agency performance. 249 Neither party
has the incentive to risk trying to establish a relationship where employees are empowered to participate with management in setting and achieving goals. Both parties direct their focus to traditional bread and butter
issues.
243 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
244 See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 111, at 898.
245 See id. at 921-23.
246 See id. While Malin and Kerchner's work is focused on teachers, the points that they
make would apply in many other public sector workplaces where the employees sought a
greater voice or the parties sought to create a high performance workplace characterized by
employee involvement and flexibility. See id. at 892.
247 See id. at 921.
248 See id. at 923.
249 Malin and Kerchner do identify and describe instances where teacher unions have
participated in alternative models to traditional labor relations. See id. at 903-11.
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To the extent that either party is interested in negotiating about nontraditional issues, the employer may fear being bound by a contract and
the union may fear that it will have to trade off benefits that its membership has learned to expect, risking member dissatisfaction. Further, bargaining about issues unrelated to traditional working conditions typically
will not be required by law. Thus, the employer can resist without penalty and the union cannot lawfully compel the employer to bargain. Indeed, if the union tried to force the employer to negotiate using either
economic or political pressure, it would likely violate the law, with potentially severe penalties. 250 When there is no collective bargaining law,
none of these risks exist.
Of course, it is true that the employer and the union cannot work
together in such a situation unless both are willing and the union's ability
to pressure the employer to do so is limited. However, the union may
have avenues of political pressure available to it, particularly in localities
with elected representatives. 2 5 1 The employer also may need employee
cooperation to achieve a particular goal, such as the Broad Prize awarded
to the Norfolk School District. 252 The union provides a convenient vehicle for obtaining employee cooperation. Thus, regimes where no collective bargaining law exists may offer opportunities for the development of
workplace cooperation between employers and unions that may be less
likely in areas where traditional collective bargaining exists by statute.
This is not to suggest the repeal of existing collective bargaining
laws, nor to promote the legal approach adopted by the Virginia legislature. A regime that encourages employers and unions to work together
to find creative approaches to resolve workplace issues and to accomplish goals important to the organization and its employees could be eas-

ily achieved through amendments to collective bargaining legislation. 253
250 See Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31, 48 (1942) (finding that participation
in an unlawful strike under the NLRA justifies termination of employees); Bd. of Trustees v.
Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 612 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (I1l. App. Ct. 1993) (finding employer violated IELRA by bargaining to impasse over a nonmandatory subject); County of
Cook v. I11.Local Labor Relations Bd., 574 N.E.2d 754, 759 (I11.App. Ct. 1991) (finding
insistence on nonmandatory bargaining subject violated the IPLRA); Detroit Newspaper
Agency, 327 N.L.R.B. 799, 808 (1999) (economic action in support of nonmandatory bargaining proposals is unlawful under the NLRA); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 31, at
792; ROBERT GORMAN & MATTHEW FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 587 (2d ed. 2004);
Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American Labor Laws", 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1, 134 (noting that under the NLRA, workers who use
economic pressure to force agreement on permissive subjects of bargaining can be terminated
without legal recourse).
251 As noted above, it is more difficult to mount political pressure in larger units like the
state as a whole.
252 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
253 Malin and Kerchner suggest that for charter schools, the charter could require teacher
involvement in decision making, while leaving the choice of the method of involvement to the
school. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 111, at 935. Minnesota requires the public em-
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Such an approach would avoid the unfriendly legal climate that has hampered union organizing in Virginia. But where no collective bargaining
law exists, the savvy union will seize the opportunity for employee involvement in decision-making that the union can achieve through a combination of political pressure and emphasis on the lack of risk to the
employer.
CONCLUSION

The comparison of public sector labor relations and the labor law of
Illinois and Virginia leads inevitably to the conclusion that the law affects the ability of unions to organize. As others have persuasively argued, however, the law is probably both chicken and egg, as the level of
unionization impacts the law and the law impacts the level of unionization. The larger and more powerful unions in Illinois have helped to
persuade the legislature to enact laws favorable to unionization and bargaining. The favorable laws in turn have led to an increase in union
membership, where the new members then supported additional
favorable changes in the law. In Virginia, unfavorable legal developments reduced, but did not eliminate, unionization. Resistant employers
can effectively exploit the law to thwart union efforts to represent employees without legal protection. This Article, however, shows that the
absence of legal protection for bargaining does not make it impossible
for a determined group of employees to organize effectively, to utilize
their available power, and to bring employers to the table to create acceptable and even favorable terms and conditions of employment. Unions and employees in both the public and private sectors should
consider the factors that have contributed to the success of those Virginia
unions that have managed to survive in a hostile legal and political environment. Adoption of similar strategies could benefit unions struggling
to survive in the private sector and help public sector unions, not only to
consolidate their current positions, but also to increase their membership.

ployer to meet and confer with the representative of the public professional employees on
matters that are not mandatory bargaining subjects. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.08 (2006).
The legislature's rationale for the requirement is to enable the knowledgeable professional
employees to help employers develop policies for the benefit of the public. MlNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179A.08 (2006). In The Paradoxof Public Sector Labor Law, Malin suggests a number of
other ways that jurisdictions can move away from the model which encourages unions to focus
exclusively on terms and conditions of employment toward a model that encourages unions
and employers to work together to solve the problems of the organization. See Martin H.
Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2009).

